Policing powers: search warrants

The Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 (SOCPA) has amended Part II of PACE to enable officers to apply for search warrants by reference to all the premises attributable to a person.

This “super warrant”, is termed an “all premises warrant”, it allows for multiple searches and is valid for up to three months. The previous search warrant is now termed “a specific premises warrant”. In this edition it is intended to discuss some of the implications of not complying with the provisions regulating the issue of warrants.

Section 15(6) of PACE requires that a warrant specify:
(a) (i) the name of the person who applies for it;
(ii) the date of issue;
(iii) the enactment under which it was issued; and
(iv) each set of premises to be searched, or (in the case of an all premises warrant) the person who is in occupation or control of premises to be searched, together with any premises under his occupation or control which can be specified are to be searched; and
(b) shall identify, so far as is practicable, the articles or persons sought.

In R v Central Criminal Court and British Railway Board, ex p AJD Holdings Ltd (1992) a warrant granted to British Rail police under S9 and Sch 1 of the PACE Act was held to be invalid because it failed to comply with S15(6)(b). The information referred to ‘all records of business dealings relating to the finances of [the company] namely, letters, notes…’, whereas the warrant referred to letters and notes but failed to identify them as records of financial dealings. The warrant did not therefore comply with S15 and was invalid under S15(1).

Similarly in R v Reading Justices, ex p South West Meat Ltd (1992). There a warrant to search the premises of South West Meat Ltd was issued to the Avon and Somerset Police at the instigation of the Meat Intervention Board, a government department with no express powers to enter and search premises. Documents were seized and retained by the Board. There were a number of errors and discrepancies in the information, the warrant and the execution of it. Principally it was issued under the Theft Act 1968 though the documents sought were not stolen goods, the description of the objects sought was too general, the documents sought were not specified with precision and the persons who could accompany the police were not identified in the warrant. It followed that the warrant was invalid under S15(1), the entry and search under it were unlawful, therefore there was no authority to seize and retain the documents which the court ordered should be returned to South West Meat Ltd.

In R v Hunt (1994) one of the grounds for appeal was that a warrant, issued under S20C(1) of the Taxes Management Act 1970, was invalid because the officers entitled to enter under the warrant were not named; instead the warrant, while naming the officer in overall charge, provided for not more than 55 officers to enter the premises. The Court of Appeal held that this did not invalidate the warrant. (The court went on to say that if the warrant had been technically defective, the court could have refused to exclude the documents seized under it, either pursuant to S78 or under its common law powers, there being no prejudice to the appellants by stating the numbers rather than the names. This is consistent with the common law approach to exclusion of evidence. It by no means follows that admitting evidence seized unlawfully would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the trial that it ought not to be admitted, and the common law has steadfastly refused to exclude real evidence simply because it was unlawfully obtained (see R v Wright (1994) and R v Stewart (1995)). However, if action is taken before trial, as in South West Meat Ltd above, the fact that there is no lawful authority to seize and retain means a court can order the police to return the evidence.

In addition to the requirements of S15 the requirements of the authorising statute must also be complied with. In Darbo v DPP (1992) a warrant issued