Failure to link correct rifle to murders ‘deprived RUC’ of investigative opportunities, says Police Ombudsman
The failure to link a rifle recovered by police in 1988 to the murders of Seamus Morris and Peter Dolan that same year “deprived RUC investigators of developing lines of enquiry and interviewing suspects”, the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland has concluded.
In a report published last week into the RUC investigation of the double murder, the Police Ombudsman Marie Anderson has also highlighted to the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) the “misattribution of weapons to murders as a potential systemic issue”.
Seamus Morris, who was 18, was murdered on August 8, 1988, as he walked with his brother across Etna Drive in Ardoyne in North Belfast. He was shot a number of times from a stolen car, which had been hijacked from a taxi driver a short time earlier in the Shankill Road area. The car then continued to nearby Brompton Park, where the gunman opened fire on a Guinness delivery lorry. Peter Dolan, aged 25, who was sitting in the front passenger seat, was shot and died from his injuries a short time later.
The Protestant Action Force (PAF), a cover name for the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), claimed responsibility for both murders. At the inquest, the RUC senior investigating officer confirmed to the coroner that neither of the victims had any connections to any paramilitary organisation.
Central to the Police Ombudsman investigation was an examination of the origins, use, recovery and disposal of the weapons used in the murders of Seamus Morris and Peter Dolan.
Mr Morris’ family believed Seamus’ murder was linked to the murders of five people at Sean Graham Bookmakers on the Ormeau Road in Belfast in 1992, as they had been led to believe the same VZ58 rifle had been used in both shootings.
However, a previous Police Ombudsman investigation into loyalist paramilitary murders and attempted murders in the 1990s, which included the Sean Graham Bookmakers attack, established that the same VZ58 rifle had not been used.
That discovery led to a request by the Police Ombudsman to the PSNI at that time to re-examine ballistic evidence from all recovered VZ58 rifles against ballistic evidence from the RUC investigation into the murders of Mr Morris and Mr Dolan.
These checks confirmed that a different VZ58 rifle (serial number R16838), which had been recovered in North Belfast in late September 1988, was in fact the weapon used.
It had previously been linked, incorrectly, to three murders at The Avenue Bar in Belfast.
“The failure to correctly link the VZ58 rifle, at the point it was recovered by police in 1988, to the murders of Mr Morris and Mr Dolan deprived RUC investigators from developing lines of enquiry and interviewing suspects. Equally, the incorrect link made between this weapon and the murders at the Avenue Bar may also have hindered that police investigation,” said Mrs Anderson.
“This misattribution of weapons to murders, by the RUC’s Weapons and Explosives Research Centre (WERC) and/or the Northern Ireland Forensic Science Laboratory, was highlighted to PSNI as a potential systemic issue. However, it is not known the extent to which murder investigations involving the use of VZ58 assault rifles may have been misdirected in consequence of these errors.”
Both the current Police Ombudsman and her predecessor, Dr Michael Maguire, have reported extensively on the 1987 importation of arms into Northern Ireland by loyalist paramilitary groups, and their use in attacks such as Loughinisland, Greysteel and Sean Graham Bookmakers. The arms included VZ58 assault rifles and semi-automatic pistols.
Police were successful in recovering up to 60 per cent of the weapons, and there were a number of arrests and subsequent convictions of individuals involved in the importation. Despite this, a significant number of weapons reached loyalist paramilitaries and were used in at least 80 sectarian murders in Northern Ireland throughout the late 1980s and 1990s. The use of VZ58 assault rifles during 1988 and 1989 has been attributed to the UVF.
Intelligence received by police in late February 1988 indicated that some firearms had been moved to a named ‘North Belfast Social Club’ and from there to storage in the Shankill and Ballysillan areas, including an address of a suspected UVF member who was arrested for the murders of Mr Morris and Mr Dolan.
Police also had information indicating that the ‘North Belfast Social Club’ had been used for paramilitary displays, storage of firearms, meetings of senior members of the UVF’s North Belfast ‘B’ Company and other serious crime. Two men active at the social club were also implicated through intelligence as being involved in the murders.
“In the six months prior to the murders, there was intelligence available to the RUC about the identities of North Belfast UVF members and their criminal activities, that the UVF had acquired weapons from the arms importation, stored them at the social club and used them in murders and attacks in Belfast, including North Belfast,” said Mrs Anderson.
“However, my investigation has not identified evidence that police initiated an investigative response to this intelligence or implemented disruptive tactics in respect of UVF activities at the ‘North Belfast Social Club’, prior to the murders of Seamus Morris and Peter Dolan.”
Although intercepting all the imported weapons may not have prevented attacks, including the murders of Mr Morris and Mr Dolan, the Police Ombudsman, believes “those that did elude seizure significantly enhanced the capability of loyalist paramilitaries to escalate its sectarian campaign against the nationalist and republican communities”.
Although the Police Ombudsman concluded that there was a prompt initial police response to the incident, with a number of lines of inquiry pursued, she believed there was a series of ‘missed investigative opportunities’ in the original RUC investigation.
Two people were arrested in the days following the attack.
The first man was arrested under terrorist legislation on suspicion of the murders of Mr Morris and Mr Dolan, a sectarian murder in November 1987, and for possession of firearms and UVF membership.
His house and the house of a relative were searched, but nothing of any evidential value was recovered.
The man was interviewed 25 times while in custody. He denied involvement with the murders and membership of the UVF, and provided an account of his movements on the morning of shooting.
He stated that he was at home in bed until 11am, the approximate time the taxi was hijacked and stolen. He then said that he left his house to have breakfast at a relative’s home. His route was about a minute’s walk from the shooting which took place at 11.20am approximately. Although this was the only alibi he provided, Police Ombudsman investigators found no record that police traced and interviewed the relative.
The police also had intelligence that linked the man to the UVF, specifically to the UVF ‘team’ at a named ‘North Belfast Social Club’, and to the storage of weapons from a loyalist arms importation in 1987.
A weapon had also been found in his home in January 1988, although a third party had been convicted of its possession.
Police Ombudsman investigators could find no evidence that the suspect’s clothing was seized for comparison against items recovered from the stolen car, or for testing for gunshot discharge residue, or that any consideration had been given to doing so.
At the time, it was also common practice to compare fingerprint marks recovered from the scenes of loyalist paramilitary attacks against those contained within the ‘Belfast Protestant Political Collection.’ These were the fingerprint impressions of 499 suspected loyalist paramilitaries that had been previously collated by RUC Fingerprints Branch. The checks in this case proved negative.
Mrs Anderson, said: “My investigators found no evidence that any actions were raised to verify the suspect’s alibi account, nor that any consideration was given to seizing the suspect’s clothes or shoes during a search of his house or that any items were subjected to testing.
“It is clear that the senior investigating officer knew of the intelligence linking the man to the storage of the imported weapons as it had been cited on the application to have his detention extended. Although the senior investigating officer’s focus was understandably on the murders, my investigation found no evidence that the intelligence concerning the suspect’s possession of these weapons was further developed.
“I consider these as significant failings”.
Police made one other arrest. This was the taxi driver whose car had been hijacked and used in the murders. There was no intelligence linking him to the murders or any other paramilitary activity and his version of events was corroborated by other witnesses. Nonetheless, the investigation could find no indication that his clothing was seized for gunshot discharge residue testing. These enquiries would have provided evidence that either linked him to the murders or eliminated him from the police investigation at an early stage. He was subsequently released without charge.
Conor Morris, who was with his brother when he was shot and killed, provided a witness statement to police, including a description of the car’s front seat passenger. However, there was no record that police considered showing him suspect photographs or that he was asked to attend an identification parade. This may have led to the identification of suspects and allowed police to carry out arrests and searches, said Mrs Anderson.
Nor could Police Ombudsman investigators find any record that police conducted enquiries in Flax Street, the most likely route taken out of Ardoyne by the murderers. Had police enquiries been conducted in this area, a witness may have been identified who held information relevant to the murder investigation.
During the course of the RUC investigation, a number of exhibits were seized by police and submitted for forensic examination, which proved negative. They included 20 discharged cartridge cases, mats, seat covers, and a cigarette butt.
Although the mats and seat covers were disposed of the following year, the whereabouts of the cigarette butt remains unknown. Police Ombudsman investigators believe that, had it still been in the possession of police, it could have provided investigative opportunities today, given advancements in forensic technology.
In addition, in late 2008, police established that one of the fingerprint marks recovered from the stolen taxi belonged to a man who, based on intelligence at the time, was a leading UVF member. He had also been observed on August 9, 1988, the day after the murders of Mr Morris and Mr Dolan, sitting in a parked car, close to where the hijacked taxi had been abandoned after the shootings.
Police documentation from the 1988 investigation showed that the fingerprints from the car had been compared to a list of paramilitaries, which included this person, and received a negative result.
The Police Ombudsman said she has been unable to establish why he was not identified in 1988 as the person who left the fingerprint mark on the hijacked car.
The PSNI was unable to locate the journals and notebooks of the two senior investigating officers who led the investigation into the murders.
Given the fact that one of the officers was deceased and that the passage of time had undermined the other’s ability to recall the murders, the absence of police journals made it challenging for investigators to assess the rationale for a number of key decisions made during the RUC investigation. The Ombudsman has stated that the absence of police journals and notebooks impeded her investigation.
Information from the Morris family indicated that there was a degree of contact with police, mostly initiated by Mrs Morris seeking updates. However, the investigation found no records detailing contact between police and the Morris family following the murder.
Although family liaison is significantly different to the service offered to bereaved families now, the Police Ombudsman nonetheless considered the level of engagement to be insufficient by standards at that time.
The Police Ombudsman investigation reviewed the intelligence that was known to RUC Special Branch both before and after the murders.
The investigation identified no intelligence that could have forewarned of, or prevented, the murders of Mr Morris and Mr Dolan and no intelligence indicating that either Mr Morris or Mr Dolan were under threat of attack from loyalist paramilitaries.
Similarly, intelligence was disseminated with police investigating the murders who then conducted further enquiries in respect of a number of identified individuals.
The investigation did not identify any evidence that any person was protected during the police investigation.
The Morris family also complained that RUC officers ‘colluded,’ either directly or indirectly, in his murder.
In the Public Statement, the Police Ombudsman refers to the recent Court of Appeal judgment in respect of her powers to make a determination of ‘collusion’: “Although the family have complained about collusion between the security forces and those who murdered Mr Morris and Mr Dolan, I am not permitted to express any view of my own on this issue, in consequence of a recent High Court judgment. The detailed narrative outlined in this public statement of the circumstances of Mr Morris’ murder must be read in the context of that judgment and in light of my obligations under Article 2 of the European Convention to provide an independent and fulsome investigation of the family’s complaints”.
The judgment is currently the subject of an appeal by the Police Ombudsman.
In conclusion, the Police Ombudsman said: “I believe that Mr Morris and Mr Dolan were the innocent victims of a campaign of sectarian violence mounted against the nationalist community. Loyalist extremists were responsible for their murders. However, given the investigative failings and omissions identified, I believe that the Morris family were failed by police in their search for accountability for the murders of their loved one.”