Criminal Law Week

Is it an offence to ride a Segway on the pavement?

Yes, said the Divisional Court in Coates v Crown Prosecution Service (CLW/11/31/4).

The defendant, Phillip Coates, was stopped by the police whilst riding a Segway (a personal transportation device consisting of a small gyroscopically stabilised platform mounted on two wheels, on which the traveller stands, powered by a battery-driven electric motor and controlled and steered by the traveller, with a maximum speed of 12.5mph) along a pavement.

He was charged with an offence contrary to section 72 of the Highway Act 1835 (penalty on persons committing nuisances by riding on footpaths, etc.), which makes it an offence to “…wilfully ride upon any footpath…; or …wilfully… drive any …carriage of any description, …upon any such footpath…”. He was convicted by a district judge, and appealed to the Divisional Court by way of case stated.

The court said that, although the defendant had been charged with “riding a motor vehicle” on the pavement, the first limb of the section 72 offence only required him to have been “riding” on the pavement. It held that if it is possible to “ride” a bicycle or a motor-bicycle on the pavement, as the authorities show, then, in the same way, it is possible to “ride” a Segway on the pavement. To be carried along on a wheeled contraption or machine, whether powered or not, can be, within the meaning of section 72, to “ride”. It pointed out that the only material difference between a Segway and a bicycle is that the passenger stands on one and sits on the other, but said that this cannot be determinative.

The court also considered the second limb of the section 72 offence, namely driving a carriage on a pavement. It observed that, since it is also clear on authority that a person riding a bicycle “drives” it within the meaning of section 72, because he guides it as well as propels it, then so too does a person riding a Segway drive the Segway.

It further observed that, even if one can be said to be “riding” something within the meaning of the first limb of section 72 only if the thing is within the class referred to in the second limb, a Segway is a “carriage” within the meaning of section 72. Just as a bicycle is a “carriage” within section 72, by parity of reasoning, a Segway is also a carriage.

The court noted that this conclusion is also reached by the application of section 85(1) of the Local Government Act 1888 (“Bicycles, tricycles, velocipedes, and other similar machines are hereby declared to be carriages within the meaning of the Highway Acts.”), as a Segway is a “similar machine”.

Furthermore, in deference to the way in which the case had been presented before the magistrates’ court, the court considered whether a Segway was a “motor vehicle”.

It noted that section 191(a) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 provides that “A motor vehicle… (a) is to be deemed to be a carriage within the meaning of any Act of Parliament”, and that section 185(1) of that Act defines motor vehicle as “a mechanically propelled vehicle intended or adapted for use on roads”, and concluded that a Segway is also a “motor vehicle” within the meaning of that section (applying Burns v Currell, in which the test propounded was “whether a reasonable person looking at the vehicle would say that one of its users would be a road user”), and hence a “carriage” within the 1835 Act. The court said that manufacturer’s literature stating that the Segway is not intended for use on roads cannot be determinative, as the test is objective.

Moreover, the question of whether the Segway is approved for use on the pavement in other European jurisdictions does not affect the application of section 72 of the 1835 Act. The defendant’s conviction was therefore upheld.

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Guidance on this issue was handed down by Judge Gilbart QC, the Recorder of Manche