Obstructing drugs search warrants

If he arrests the person he may also utilise the power under Section 18 PACE to search any premises occupied or controlled by the suspect, provided he has reasonable grounds for believing there are on those premises controlled drugs.

Where an officer reasonably suspects that controlled drugs are in the possession of
a person on any premises he may either;

n enter and search the premises under section 17 (1)(b) PACE for the purpose of arresting the person for an arrestable drugs offence and then, having arrested him, use the section 18 PACE powers to search the premises occupied by the person, or
n seek a search warrant from a magistrate under Section 23 (3) MDA.

This article considers some of the legal difficulties that can arise when police action is taken to prevent those present inside the premises from frustrating the drugs search warrant process itself.

The relevant parts of Section 23 (3) MDA provide that, where the magistrate is satisfied there are reasonable grounds to suspect that any controlled drugs are in the possession of any person on any premises he may grant a warrant authorising a police offer to;

n enter, if need by force, the premises concerned,
n to search the premises and any person found therein and
n seize/detain any controlled drugs found, provided there are reasonable grounds to believe an MDA offence has been committed in relation to them.

In Chief Constable of Thames Valley v Hepburn [2002 EWCA Civ. 1841], the warrant issued empowered the police to search the premises but did not include a power to search any persons.
On execution of the warrant Mr Hepburn sought to leave the premises but was forcibly restrained and a struggle ensued. He was eventually handcuffed, searched and later arrested when some cannabis was found about six to eight feet from the point of the struggle.

Following arrest he was taken to the station but later released without charge. Mr Hepburn brought a civil action against the police for false imprisonment.

The Court of Appeal Civil Division held that the warrant did not authorise the searching and stopping of Mr Hepburn, and rejected the contention of the Chief Constable that there is an implicit power to search a person when executing a warrant.

The court also rejected an alternative submission of the Chief Constable that the police, though lacking express power under the terms of the warrant, had a “margin of appreciation” entitling them to take reasonable steps to take control of the premises. This, the Chief constable argued, included restricting the movement about the premises of any person for as long as was reasonably necessary.

The court’s ruling on this point was that: “If a person obstructs a police officer in the execution of his of her duty an offence is committed and a power of arrest arises. That, and not an implied power to detain or manhandle people who are doing nothing wrong, is how the law protects officers executing a search warrant from interference,”[Sedley LJ at paragraph 8].

Offences of obstructing the police contrary to Section 23(4) MDA and section 89(2) Police Act 1996 are not arrestable offences within section 24 PACE. Accordingly, the court’s ruling that a power of arrest arises when an offence of obstruction is committed appears erroneous.

Before any such power can arise, the officer must not only have reasonable grounds for suspecting the obstruction offence has been committed but, under Section 25 (2) PACE, he must also be of the view that service of a summons on the suspect is impracticable or inappropriate because one of the general arrest conditions in subsection (3) are satisfied.

The issue and the ruling of Sedley LJ was revisited 12 months later by the Divisional Court in DPP v Meadon [2003 EWHC 3005 (Admin)].

Mr Meadon was acquitted by magistrates of the offences of obstructing and assaulting a police officer contrary to Sections 89(2) and 89 (1) Police Act 1996 respectively. The prosecution appealed to